The Baker Report is based on a central fantasy: that magically, within a year, the Iraqi Army will be able to take over most of the fighting from U.S. combat forces.

There is no basis for that, though.

Iraq barely has a functioning Army today, and U.S. forces have been trying to bolster it for three and a half years now. Many of the units don’t even show up for duty. And when they do, they often don’t perform well. The police forces are even worse, as the Iraq Study Group acknowledges. And each ministry, bizarrely, has its own protection force.

Just because James Baker and Lee Hamilton have spoken doesn’t mean the rest of us have to shut up and get in line.
The allegiances of many of these security forces are less to the Iraqi government than to their own sectarian groups and militias. In fact, some of the same people are in the militias.

The idea that all of a sudden, with some embedding, the U.S. will be able to transform the Iraqi Army and police is fanciful.

But that’s the whole megillah: “The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take primary responsibility for combat operations,” the report says. “By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.”

But why should a deterioration in the security situation on the ground be anything but totally expected at this point? It’s been deteriorating steadily all along.

And the report asks way too much of Prime Minister Maliki. As the report notes, most of the violence stems not from Al Qaeda but from sectarian militias. “Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: There are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.”

Yet the report says that Maliki should complete the implementation of a law to disarm the militias by May 2007. That seems ludicrous. Maliki has no power to disarm the militias; in fact, his ability to stay in power depends on the support of Muqtada Al-Sadr, who has the biggest militia in the country—60,000 strong. And the incentive for all the militias is to keep their weapons, especially since the Baker Report acknowledges that U.S. forces can’t stay there forever.

By setting Maliki up for failure, the Baker Report is giving Bush a way out.

“If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government,” the report notes.

The economic milestones will also be difficult to attain, as the Baker Report prescribes more bitter IMF pills for the people of Iraq to keep swallowing.

“The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund,” it states. “Most prominently, subsidies have been reduced—for instance, the price per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents.” That more than ten-fold increase in price has not been met with glee by the Iraqi people. But there’s more to come. “Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum products,” the report dictates. It also calls for U.S. energy firms to enter the Iraqi oil sector.

This economic policy will only impose more hardship on the Iraqi people, which will increase their hatred of the U.S. occupation force—and the government that does its bidding.

The Baker Report tries to have it both ways on some crucial issues. While it says it is against a large increase in troops, it then says it “could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission.”

And while it echoes John Kerry’s 2004 campaign comment that “the President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq,” the report in the next sentence adds: “If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.”

At least the Baker Report acknowledges that the situation is “grave and deteriorating,” though. The goal is no longer “total victory,” as Bush put it so often, but now something much less than that: to “avert anarchy,” “avert catastrophe,” stave off further “chaos” and “the potential for catastrophe,” and prevent “a sectarian conflict” that “could open a Pandora’s box of problems.” The report could barely be more apocalyptical.

And it does make two solid criticisms of the Bush Administration toward the end.

First, it notes that the Administration, which has already spent about $400 billion on this war, has been “bypassing the normal review” of Pentagon expenditures for it. “Most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations,” it says. This “erodes budget discipline and accountability.”

Second, it notes that “there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq.” It cites one day in July when the Pentagon reported 93 attacks or significant acts of violence when, in fact, there were 1,100. Acidly, the report adds: “Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.”

But having made its criticisms on the margins, the Baker Report is trying to silence others about the fundamentals.

“Success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization,” James Baker and Lee Hamilton declare in their opening note. “Americans can and must enjoy right of robust debate within a democracy. Yet U.S foreign policy is doomed to failure—as is any course of action in Iraq—if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus.”

That’s a bunch of crap.

The U.S. is going to fail there regardless of dissent here. And the Baker Report should not be used as a gag in the mouths of the majority of Americans who want all troops out within a year.

Just because James Baker and Lee Hamilton have spoken doesn’t mean the rest of us have to shut up and get in line.