Just as predictably, radical Islam has been depicted as a vast and rapidly spreading disease, engulfing and indoctrinating Pakistan’s teeming millions. This depiction has been sharpened by the unerring and unending search for Al-Qaeda in the nebulous mountainous Pak-Afghan border.

The mainstream media’s Bush-friendly construction of the Pakistani polity is to be expected. On the other hand, there has been a dearth of serious investigation into the state-society dialectic in Pakistan and even less into understanding left politics in the country. More than anything this reflects the still fractured nature of the international left, and the enormous emphasis of progressive forces in general on the high-profile imperial battlegrounds of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan .

At the very least, Pakistan’s complex history vis a vis Afghanistan merits a more comprehensive investigation into the country’s political economy from the perspective of the international left. This contribution will outline in general terms Pakistan’s political economy since the fall of the Eastern bloc, with specific emphasis on the post-September 11th situation. In the process, an attempt will be made to undertake a general analysis on the state of the Pakistani left and prospects for the future.

After the cold war

After the cold war, as has been the case throughout the country’s history, Pakistan’s ruling class remained loyal to the United States, even though empire’s patronage whittled considerably following the collapse of Soviet communism. Because of civil war in Afghanistan and US geo-strategic interests in the Caspian region, Pakistan could not be ostracised entirely. Even so, a considerable period of alienation ensued for Pakistan’s rulers, particularly during Clinton’s presidency as that administration attempted to consolidate the new and burgeoning relationship with India.

Through the decade of the 1990s, four so-called elected governments were summarily dismissed, none completing more than two and a half years of four year terms. The military-bureaucratic oligarchy that has dominated state affairs since Pakistan’s creation remained all-powerful - all four governments were dismissed by presidential decree, a legacy of General Zia ul Haq, empire’s favourite son through the 1980s. Bourgeois democratic institutions and ethics have never taken root in Pakistan (although it is a myth to suggest that they have taken root in any post-colonial third world state, but perhaps significantly more so in most states compared to Pakistan), and this fact was underscored by the experience of the 90s. Pakistan is perhaps one of the prime examples of the classic development-underdevelopment paradox of global capitalism in that its political and economic evolution has been dramatically affected by the whims of empire. Its social organisation of production remains capitalist and pre-capitalist at the same time while its formal political institutions remain virtually unchanged from the days of the British Raj.

In the 1990s, this was borne out by the fact that over 70% of Pakistanis still derived their livelihood from agriculture (a figure that has decreased only marginally in the decade since); the vast majority of working-class wage-earners were part of the so-called informal sector on account of the dramatic fragmentation of the industrial workforce (only 3% of Pakistan’s workforce is unionised); and a larger number of working people were resorting to self-employment in the temporary and insecure service sector. In agriculture, tenure arrangements have changed considerably in recent decades. There were over 25 million people landless agricultural labourers in 1990 (a figure that has increased to 30 million subsequently), and there was evidence to suggest that land concentration may actually have increased since Pakistan’s creation, largely on account of increased mechanisation and commodification in the sector.

The perverse nature of national politics also tells an interesting story. While traditional landed families are no longer able to exercise a great deal of non-economic coercion over dependents in rural areas, they have retained a fair amount of political power at the centre. Throughout Pakistan’s history, the landed class has dominated the mainstream bourgeois political parties, most importantly the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Because political parties suffer from a complete lack of autonomy vis a vis the state, the landed class (along with the nouveau-riche industrialist class which is essentially an outgrowth of old landed families) has articulated its rather fractured interests by lobbying for a share of power with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. This pattern reflects the complete subordination of overtly political entities to a political army (and to a lesser extent, civil bureaucracy). This, according to Hamza Alavi, is the crisis of the over-developed post-colonial state.

As such this pattern has not been interrupted since the country's creation, in large part due to the on-again, off-again patronage of Pakistan’s civil-military establishment by empire. Any organic political process has been stifled, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of empire. This pattern was best manifest during the 1990s. As such, there is little in the way of a genuine struggle for establishment of bourgeois political institutions because of the underdeveloped nature of the indigenous non-state bourgeoisie, and the overwhelming power of a state bourgeoisie uninterested in any fundamental change in status quo. In the final analysis, the class interests of the former are simply subsumed by the class interests of the latter.

Through the 1980s, the corporate interests of Pakistan’s army became quite explicit. By the 1990s, of Pakistan’s 10 biggest grossing corporations, 6 were army corporations. Serving and retired army officials started encroaching into civilian institutions during the 1970s and this process has intensified since. During the tenure of Pervez Musharraf, this evolving situation has reached ridiculous proportions. The widespread practice of allotment of agricultural and residential plots to army officers has also resulted in large-scale conflicts emerging between working class groups and the state, most of which have been easily controlled. In any case, the army’s dominance over state and society is consummate.

In the 1990s, the army also made crucial decisions vis a vis the mujahideen that had been cultivated in the 1980s as the final frontier against Soviet communism. Patronage of parochial and violent sectarian and ethnic groups was modus operandi for Pakistan’s notorious intelligence agencies throughout the decade. The agencies ran riot on account of the changed geo-political imperatives in Afghanistan - the now ‘surplus’ mujahideen had to be accommodated within Pakistan and most significantly in the blood-stained Kashmir valley.

This state-sponsored politicisation of religion naturally enhanced the visibility of the religious right. And while the right has greatly expanded its support base in recent decades on account of state patronage, it is highly misleading to describe it as an extremely powerful social force. In fact, as a social class, the religious clergy is relatively powerless in most of rural Pakistan (with some significant exceptions mostly in the ethnically Pakhtoon areas). What has happened through the course of the 1980s and 1990s is that the religious right has become part of the power nexus alongside the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, the landed class and the nouveau-riche industralists. As will be discussed below, the right has gained considerably from the geo-political shifts since September 2001.

Meanwhile, starting from the 1970s, organic politics has been on the decline in Pakistan. The state has consciously coopted both the trade union and student movements that were at the forefront of nationwide mobilisations through the early 1970s. The systematic attacks on left forces were combined with the infusion of identity politics into such organic formations along the lines of what has been outlined above. Meanwhile professional groups, writers and intellectuals have also been coopted and/or distanced from working class formations. This fragmentation of progressive forces does mirror similar phenomena in other parts of the third world, yet it is arguable that this process has been far more consummate in Pakistan because of the enormous influence of imperialism, particularly with the beginning of the Afghan war in 1979.

It must also be pointed out that the revolutionary left in Pakistan has been blighted with the problem that faced much of the left around the world - the overwhelming influence of the Soviet and Chinese experiences. While it is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss the failings of the Cold War left in Pakistan, there is little doubt that the Pakistani left was unable to generate a sufficient organic presence within the working class so as to withstand the ideological and physical onslaught of the state and imperialism. The greatest evidence of this is the virtual disappearance of the Pakistani left following the fall of the Soviet Union. An alarming vacuum has persisted in left politics in the country for well over a decade now. There has been virtually no fresh reconsideration of trends within Pakistan and globally, and therefore much of the left remains stuck in complete inertia. Particularly telling is the virtual absence of youth within left circles.

The NGO phenomenon has also been an important factor in debilitating the left. A large number of political activists are now full time employees of donor-funded organisations, while the overwhelming propaganda of the new world order and the apolitical values of the post-cold war era have dramatically reduced the ability of the left to engage meaningfully with a rapidly changing working class and other parts of society, particularly youth. Nonetheless, the left itself is largely responsible for its decline, and faces the urgent task of regenerating its praxis. There can be little doubt that September 11th has led to a dramatic radicalisation of Pakistani society along the lines of what is happening around the world. It remains to be seen whether the left can take this cue to build a new challenge to capitalism.


September 11, the right and "terror"

It is common knowledge how the events of September 11th precipitated an enormous rhetorical shift in the policies of empire. It has subsequently been established by many observers and insiders that the Bush administration was keen to take on a more interventionist posture in south-west Asia well before the attacks of September 11th. In any case, the opportunity presented by September 11th was seized by the Bush administration and the Pakistani military-bureaucratic oligarchy alike.

The most significant change as far as Pakistan's ruling class was concerned, at least on the face of it, was in terms of foreign policy. Pakistan was by the time the only government in the world to recognise the Taliban government and was compelled to withdraw support upon American instruction. It is widely suggested however that the chief of Pakistan's infamous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), sent to Afghanistan prior to the American invasion to convince the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, instead planned with the Taliban leadership on how to best withstand the coming military onslaught. In general, the most important outcome of the Afghan war of the 1980s for Pakistan was the enormous increase in power of the intelligence agencies. Therefore, it is important to qualify all of the supposed policy shifts that have been undertaken by the Musharraf junta post-September 11th. It is simply not accurate to suggest that the Pakistani establishment operates as a monolith and that the complex relationship that has been cultivated between the army and the religious right over a period of almost three decades can be undone easily.

In any case, the significance of this rhetorical shift is underlined by the admission of the Pakistani leadership of the existence of "terrorism" in Pakistan. In particular, the Indian claims that Pakistan has been fomenting "cross-border terrorism" in Kashmir for decades had been rebutted fiercely until the change in geo-political climate. As such, the symbol of the emergent "peace" in the region is the gas pipeline project being supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which runs through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for which the US has long been courting Indian partnership. While this project is still in the planning stages, it is clear that the logic of "peace" is driven by the imperatives of capitalist expansion, and it remains to be seen how durable the Indo-Pak detente is.

Meanwhile the new anti-terrorist stance has been adopted vis a vis sectarian groups operating domestically as well. Again it must be emphasised that this has been a rhetorical shift more than anything else. While USAID is pouring money into educational reform projects seeking to stunt the growth and proliferation of religious schools, the intense consensual relationship between state agencies and the right has been hard to dismantle. Nonetheless, high-profile arrests of some religious leaders (upon arrest it is typically suggested that they are linked to Al-Qaeda), a symbolic yet destructive military operation in the tribal areas adjoining the Afghan border and pronouncements of a policy of "enlightened moderation" have represented the Musharraf junta's public image.

All the same, the religious right scored unprecedented victories in the October 2002 general election . An alliance of 6 religious parties garnered almost 20% of the popular vote, controlling the provincial government of the Pukhtoon Northwest Frontier Province, sharing power in the Balochistan provincial government and controlling the swinging vote in the national assembly. It would be highly inaccurate to suggest that the establishment did not plan for this outcome or was dramatically opposed to it. The highly emotive anti-imperialist sloganeering of the religious right at a time when anti-American sentiments were running high explained the vote only to a certain extent.

The fact that the right and the establishment still share common interests was proven when the right, despite spewing out consistent rhetoric condemning the military and its support of empire, signed a constitutional amendments package in December 2003 giving General Pervez Musharraf unrivalled powers to control and dismiss parliament as deemed necessary. Subsequently disputes have emerged over Musharraf's right to hold the offices of president and chief of army staff concurrently. However, there is little to suggest that the long-term relationship between the right and the establishment has been substantively altered.

This point needs to be reiterated time and again, particularly given the imperial construction of radical Islam in the first world. While on the one hand General Musharraf is keen to fit the desired image of a moderate anti-terrorist, on the other hand the situation within the country belies his claims of clamping down upon the right. The current imperatives of capitalist expansion seem to demand that figures such as Musharraf take very visible initiatives to break with the right. However it is important to bear in mind that policies of empire are necessarily whimsical - it was the CIA that propped up the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets, the same mujahideen who are now the world's most dangerous terrorists. With the fall of the "evil empire" it may be argued that radical Islam is set to be imperialism's arch nemesis for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the possibility of another reversal in empire's strategy always remains. This issue remains a flashpoint in Pakistan - some liberals argued that "surgical strikes" by the US against the Taliban should be supported because only imperialism possessed the means to deal with the disease that is radical Islam. Such opinions reflect not only the confusion of the liberals in the country, but also indicate that such elements have a very shallow reading of history.

The rest

The traditional mainstream parties PML and PPP are as politically weak as they ever have been. A hastily concocted offshoot of the PML forms the "King's Party" that is in the government . Many PPP influentials have been bought over to the government side and while the PPP managed to garner the larger proportion of the popular vote in the 2002 general election, the party is a shadow of the populist force that erupted into Pakistani politics in the late 1960s and ruled through the 1970s - the period in which the army was at its lowest ebb following the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

The increased powerlessness of electoral bourgeios parties is a worldwide phenomenon with the post-cold war consolidation of global capitalism and the rise of neo-liberalism. For all of the opposition's banter against military rule since 1999, the fact remains that there is little in the way of a substantive difference between the current government's major policy frameworks and those that the opposition would adopt if in power. This was proven through the 1990s and the four different governments that came and went, particularly as far as economic and foreign policies are concerned. And this has been proven time and again over the past three years - the PPP has even gone so far as to censure individual party members for publicly criticising the US. In general, all of the mainstream parties ascribe quite willingly to imperialism's terrorism discourse.

The virtual loss of state sovereignty vis a vis economic policy also reflects the bankruptcy of all shades of the political spectrum . As has been well documented, most third world economies, and particularly those with extensive relationships with the international financial institutions (IFIs), have adopted almost identical macroeconomic policy frameworks that have exacerbated contractionary tendencies, worsened already appalling debt problems, and severely compromised domestic industry, agriculture, and the welfare of the working class majority at large. This is the case too with Pakistan. Since September 2001, the IFIs (and most bilateral donors) have signed unprecedented loan and technical assistance packages with the Pakistani government. Approximately US$5 billion has been committed in a little over three years, as compared to less than US$500 million in the preceding 2 years.

While the Islamists' government in NWFP has happily signed agreement after agreement with the IFIs, the PPP and opposition PML have offered token dissent against the combination of rising prices, spiraling unemployment, and the selling off of state assets. The IFIs - and the donor community at large - have not only sanctioned Musharraf's military rule but actually supported and congratulated the junta over the past three years. While it can and should be argued that the mainstream parties have been systematically weakened by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, it is also important to bear in mind that these parties also represent the ruling class, and therefore are just as averse to social and political change as the military-bureaucratic oligarchy itself.

The left

As mentioned above, the post-cold war left in Pakistan is most conspicuous for being a virtual political non-entity. That being said, the radical left has always been a marginal social and political force in Pakistan. Even in early decades of the country's creation until the 1980s when the left was considerably more organised than it is today, it worked through more populist formations and was unable to represent itself overtly due to numerous factors, in particular because of deliberate state efforts to crush it. Nonetheless, Soviet and Chinese support, albeit erratic, did ensure that the left remained a reasonably potent political force, at the very least able to significantly influence popular political organisations.

While the decade of the 1990s was a lost one for the left in many a country, the dramatic renewal of direct colonial posture after September 11th has precipitated revival in many countries. For example recent general elections in India, where the radical left has always been an important political force, indicate that the left has gained much ground on account of the limited difference between the mainstream Congress and BJP parties. Aside from this, non-electoral political processes where working class formations have engaged in direct resistance have also proliferated in India. In general, the Indian left, like the Latin American left, or even the left in many parts of South-East Asia, are networked internationally, whereas the Pakistani left has hardly been able to maintain itself as a viable political entity let alone link substantively with emergent waves of radicalisation around the world.

This pattern has unfortunately persisted even over the past three years. For example, while in many parts of the world progressive forces have been at the forefront of anti-imperialist resistance after September 2001, in Pakistan the religious right's sloganeering has been far more prominent with the left able to mobilise much less popular support. In general, the left's major platforms in the past - trade unions and students - are no longer nearly as dynamic as they once were and remain largely coopted and corrupted by the state.

As in many other parts of the world however, in Pakistan too livelihood-based struggles have proliferated in recent years. Some of the more prominent movements include landless farmers struggling for land, coastal fishing communities struggling against corporate trawling and state encroachment, landless squatters struggling for shelter, and affectees of mega water projects struggling for land, livelihoods, and preservation of age-old eco-systems. These movements, to the extent that they have been politicised beyond their immediate concerns, have questioned the existing social contract and directly confronted the state and dominant classes, in particular the army. Unfortunately however, while mainstream bourgeois parties and the right have understandably refused to build upon such struggles, the left is simply not organised enough as a force to build upon them. This vacuum has often been filled by NGOs that have in many cases de-politicised movements through a combination of injecting money and adopting conciliatory positions vis a vis dominant groups.

It is unclear if and when a regeneration of progressive political forces will take place in Pakistan. Perhaps more important at this stage is to support emergent organic struggles such as those outlined above that can be further politicised. Such struggles are a necessary condition for the development of a potent political force that learns from its past indiscretions and formulates a meaningful strategy for the present given the continuing collusion of state and imperialism, the lack of autonomy of bourgeois parties, and the evolving monster that is neo-liberal capitalism both within Pakistan and around the world.