Ralph’s Revolt: The Case for Joining Nader’s Rebellion by Greg Bates, 2004, Common Courage Press, 175 pages

It is farcical that the left demonizes the current president and his administration as being particularly egregious in their criminality, and by doing so affirms the lackluster Kerry as the antidote. Bush is more successful at being cruel says Bates, and little more; compared to Nixon, Johnson, Kennedy and Truman, he is “bushleague by comparison..” There is much analyzing too of the rightward drift of the Democratic Party here, and explaining how this is likely to continue without the threat posed by a serious and necessarily third party challenge; or second for that matter.

Nader has easily done more for the American people than all of the other candidates and their running mates combined. Contrary to much even progressive conventional wisdom, he has continued his public service since 2000. When his name and the words “public servant” are uttered together it is not a cliched and perfunctory gesture. As opposed to the frontrunners and their ubiquitous cant and subterfuge, on the stump, in an interview, Nader’s every word frames real issues in their proper context, is urgent, without a trace of superfluity, aware of the magnitude of the problems we face, with viable solutions. By natural right his message ought to appeal to the vast preponderance of the electorate.

It is unfortunate, although not to underrate its significance, that the strongest argument Bates makes to encourage support of Nader’s campaign is that of voting strategically under the rules of the Electoral College. Bates says the upcoming election is really 58 elections, each state’s and the District of Colombia, and Maine and Nebraska wherein each district counts its votes separately. It is crucial to consider this in building momentum for a third party. Bates avers that in the other than about fifteen swing states, progressives will not be supporting Bush by voting for Nader. He goes even further and examines meticulously scenarios that may likely develop in which progressives even in smaller states with few electoral votes should feel safe voting for Nader. Noting that it is easier to sway power when it feels vulnerable Bates says in any event, progressives would do well to make a potential Kerry win as narrow as possible.

Bates here clarifies that both Noam Chomsky, who wonders aloud how anyone could have taken his ABB comments otherwise, and Howard Zinn plan to vote for Nader because they are in the safe state of Massachusetts. Beyond that, however, he cites the ever astute Chomsky: “Activist movements, if at all serious, pay virtually no attention to which faction of the business party is in office, but continue with their daily work, from which elections are a diversion – which we cannot ignore, any more than we can ignore the sun rising; they exist.”

It hardly goes without saying that a Kerry win does not at all promise a progressive agenda. Kerry’s supposed high minded ideals, says Bates, could translate into nefarious deeds. He points out that often the party that supposedly stands for a certain principle, the Democrats for social programs for example, is better able to lead the charge for its amendment, even its destruction. The Republicans were better able to open China under Nixon because they didn’t have to fear being called soft on Communism like the Democrats, notes Bates. Similarly Clinton and the Democrats were able to destroy welfare, for which the Republicans would have faced outrage and wide resistance. A Kerry presidency may well more legitimate an attack on Social Security or a stepped up war effort in Iraq, writes Bates.

A large part of this book rightfully critiques the political positions of Kerry and the demise of the Democratic party, as much as it forwards the Nader run, who just happens to be the progressive alternative. Kerry has backed every major regressive policy of the Bush administration, including among others, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Patriot Act, expansion of the military budget, and the tax cuts for the rich, according to Bates. As senator, he has also advocated sanctions against Iraq which killed more than a million Iraqi children, perennially promoted Israel’s murderous seige of the Palestinians, and approved NAFTA and GATT. He wants to build coalitions and exercise multilateralism reports Bates, not because it would allow for international decision-making through the U.N. or so that the U.S. obeys international law, but because it would strengthen and extend U.S. imperialism.

Bates observes that Kerry wants to cut corporate taxes still further. Roger C. Altman, a top Kerry aid, thinks the right tax code is the way to help the poor. “Gone is any whiff of aid to the poor,” writes Bates, "any sense that government could reinvigorate the New Deal politics of FDR.” Kerry’s proposal for national health care is not single payer, the most efficient and effective way to provide such care, says Bates, but more corporate tax subsidies. Of Kerry’s economic program, Bates cites Altman as saying, “It is a credible, enforceable policy that will position Kerry to the right of Bush on fiscal policy.”

There are other strategic factors to consider in supporting Nader, according to Bates. He writes that in 2000 Nader brought a million voters to the polls who otherwise wouldn’t have voted. A similar number could be decisive in helping the Democrats make gains in congressional elections, where not all Democrats are as regressive as Kerry, and help stymie a Bush agenda.