Fruitless hunt for illegal arms winding down
Investigation by U.S. teams yields little beyond new details of advanced missile program

By Dafna Linzer
Associated Press
Published January 2, 2004

BAGHDAD -- In nine months, not a single item has been found in Iraq from a long and classified intelligence list of weapons of mass destruction that guided the work of dozens of elite teams from the military and the CIA during the most secretive, expensive and fruitless weapons hunt in history.

The teams have all but ceased searching for evidence of chemical and nuclear weapons programs, having concluded that the only line of investigation likely to be productive is in the biological area, those involved in the hunt said.


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For U.S. allies, arms-control experts and some involved in the hunt, the lack of evidence in a war premised on the threat of proliferation will have far-reaching consequences in the coming year for the United States in its efforts to curb Iran, North Korea, Syria and others.

A look at new details of Iraq's clandestine efforts and its behavior during the 13 years when it was supposed to disarm could serve as a lesson for future moves against any potential nation that is suspected of trying to acquire such weapons.

The U.S.-led effort has shed new light on Iraqi expertise, some of which was unknown to UN inspectors and has not been made public before.

In one case, Iraqis used front companies to import German and Russian missile parts from 1999 to 2002, the period when they banned UN inspectors from the country. They later lied to inspectors and said some of the parts were made in Iraq.

"We didn't accept the sanctions then," said Modher Sadeq-Saba al-Tamimi, Iraq's top missile designer. "From 1999-2002 we bought German and Russian parts" for the Al Samoud missiles that later were destroyed by returning UN inspectors because several test flights showed a capability to go beyond a 93-mile UN limit.

The purchases, often done through a web of middlemen and front companies, were investigated by the UN, but such Iraqi imports would not be considered a violation. American investigators still are sifting documents.

Modher is free and has shared his work with British military personnel. Ambitious and talented, he told The Associated Press in two interviews that he and his teams dreamed up ingenious designs for long-range missiles that he hoped to work on once sanctions were lifted.

That information, which also would not be considered a violation by UN inspectors, constitutes the bulk of what the American-led search has learned in the missile area.

Inspections leader may quit

The teams have closed their chemical and nuclear files, and David Kay, the man leading the search, is considering stepping down, sources involved in the hunt said.

The remaining hope for the operation is in the biological area, a field that raised the suspicions of UN inspectors. Kay's teams have found no evidence that Iraq had smallpox, but continue to question Iraqi biologists and to pursue information about anthrax and aflatoxin.

Of the handful of Iraqi weapons scientists remaining in U.S. custody, two are missile experts and seven worked on past biological programs, according to Iraqi officials working for the American occupation authority.

All continue to say that Iraq has not worked on weapons of mass destruction for years.

Modher said he gave his word to Hussein that the Al Samoud missiles were designed to conform with UN regulations and that his staff signed letters forswearing proscribed activities.

On Feb. 20, 2003, one month before the U.S. attacked, Modher met with Hussein, his sons and five other men responsible for Iraq's air defenses. "We talked about the preparations," he said. Modher had designed anti-aircraft missiles "but they were never fired because nobody fought," he said.

There was no mention in the meeting of other defense systems, such as chemical or biological weapons, Modher recalled.

To date, Congress has approved $700 million for the weapons hunt, according to congressional staff, a figure higher than previously reported. The UN effort during the 1990s cost an estimated $60 million a year, which was paid by several countries and the United Nations.

The Bush administration began planning its hunt six months before it went to war, military officers said.

Working in secret, the Pentagon set up the first U.S. teams designed to search for, identify and destroy chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The mission, which military planners expected to be brief, was a failure, and in June the Pentagon announced a larger operation with investigative capabilities to be led by Kay and Gen. Keith Dayton.

By August the operation, known as the Iraq Survey Group, was under way. Its most notable determination to date has been that two mobile trailers found in April and May were not biological laboratories as senior administration officials had claimed. In a BBC interview, Kay called the trailers "a fiasco."

His first order of business was to throw out a U.S. intelligence list that inaccurately identified locations of chemical weapons, stores of highly enriched uranium and laboratories for anthrax and smallpox. He told team members that working off lists had been a mistake.

Many interviewed, no charges

Instead he ran the hunt as an investigation, the way the United Nations had done when he briefly worked for it in Iraq in 1991. Under Kay's direction, hundreds of Iraqis were interviewed and some were detained. No one has been charged. University science professors said Iraq Survey Group staff still come by once a week to poke around and ask questions.

The CIA declined to comment on Iraq Survey Group activities or methods. It would not release spending figures for the operation, and Kay turned down a request for an interview. His interim report remains classified.

Since the war was launched, American allies and UN Security Council members have talked of bolstering the work of UN inspectors and have used negotiations with Iran and North Korea as a way of reducing the threats those countries could pose.

The United States tried a different route, pushing to rebuke Iran and North Korea's nuclear activities in the Security Council, but found no support for the moves.

"As long as the United States has a pre-emptive policy on the books, no one will pass sanctions against Iran or North Korea," said Hans Blix, the former chief UN inspector who will head a new non-proliferation center based in Stockholm.

That may be true, said William Kristol, editor of the conservative Weekly Standard magazine, but he said the sudden attention paid to the issue of weapons of mass destruction is a tribute to the war.

"I don't believe the Iranians feel more confident that they can get away with a nuclear program today than they did a year ago," Kristol said.


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