[SLP] Behind the War in Afghanistan


THE PEOPLE


NOVEMBER 2001


VOL. 111 NO. 8





WHAT ARE THE REAL REASONS


for the war in AFGHANISTAN?





By Diane Secor





The Bush administration has told the American public to prepare for a


long war on terrorism, ostensibly in response to the Sept. 11 attacks on


the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. There seems to be a general


consensus among the administration, most members of Congress and most of


the U.S. media that the U.S. role in this war is a clear-cut case of


self-defense and that violence is necessary to prevent more terrorist


strikes on U.S. soil. For all intents and purposes, however, the "war on


terrorism" is a war on Afghanistan, and there is substantial evidence


indicating that an Afghan war was planned several months ago and that,


in reality, this is another war over oil.





Last March, long before Sept. 11, Jane's International Security News


reported on an agreement that had all the earmarks of a multinational


coalition aimed at undermining the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. "India


is believed to have joined Russia, the U.S.A. and Iran in a concerted


front against Afghanistan's Taliban regime," Jane's reported. "India is


believed to have supplied the Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah


Massoud, with high-altitude warfare equipment. Indian defense advisors,


including air force helicopter technicians, are reportedly providing


tactical advice in operations against the Taliban....Military sources


indicated that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are being used as bases to


launch anti-Taliban operations by India and Russia."





In short, something resembling the multinational coalition so much in


the news since Sept. 11 has been in place for at least six months.


Furthermore, this pre-September coalition also had a basic strategy in


place to throw out the Taliban. This certainly calls into question the


U.S. media's clear overall implication that it was only after Sept. 11


that a multinational force banded together and concluded that the


Taliban had to be replaced.





The following statement from Jane's March 15 report is even more


revealing: "Several recent meetings between the newly instituted


Indo-U.S. and Indo-Russian joint working groups on terrorism led to this


effort to tactically and logistically counter the Taliban. Intelligence


sources in Delhi said that while India, Russia and Iran were leading the


anti-Taliban campaign on the ground, Washington was giving the Northern


Alliance information and logistic support."





Why does the United States want to overthrow the Taliban and put another


Afghan regime in power? Why is Bush taking the risk of a larger regional


war and possibly igniting future terrorist attacks against Americans?


Zalmay Khalilzad may hold the key to unraveling this mystery.





According to a May 23 White House press release, Khalilzad was selected


for the post of "special assistant to the president and senior director


for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues, National Security


Council."





Khalilzad does have the political connections to get the job. Eli J.


Lake, United Press International, on Jan. 18 reported that Khalilzad


"who served under President Reagan's State Department and President


Bush's Pentagon and influenced the last American adventure in [the]


region when the CIA helped ship surface-to-air missiles to the


mujaheddin, the holy warriors who fought against the Soviets. Khalilzad


now finds himself in a position to influence the next administration's


policy for cleaning up the mess created by the mujaheddin's struggle in


the 1980s, as the man in charge of staffing the Pentagon for the


Bush-Cheney transition team."





Interestingly, according to the Center for Strategic International


Studies' Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, Khalilzad's Afghan policy


seemed to fit right in with the scenario outlined in the Jane's report.


He "argue[d] in no uncertain terms for supporting the Pashtun majority


in Afghanistan to roll back the Taliban government and working


'discreetly' with Iran and Russia to destabilize the government in


Kabul."





However, as recently as 1999, Khalilzad favored some degree of


"engagement," as opposed to "destabilization" of the Taliban regime. In


a white paper for the House International Relations Committee, he said


that "U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should follow two parallel and


complementary tracks, one of which extends a hand to the Taliban and the


other of which prepares for a much tougher policy should the Taliban


reject U.S. overtures."





What accounts for Khalilzad's change of heart? UPI also reported that he


is "an analyst for the Rand Corp. and before that the chief consultant


for Unocal, the oil company that sought to build a pipeline through


Afghanistan."





The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA)


issued a September document on Afghanistan which noted the stormy


relationship between the Taliban and Unocal affecting two pipelines that


Unocal had planned to construct through Afghanistan:





A $2 billion Central Asian Gas Pipeline would have transported natural


gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, then be "linked with Pakistan's


natural gas grid at Sui." In June 1998, the consortium consisted of


these firms: "Unocal and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil held a combined 85


percent stake in Centgas, while Turkmenrusgas owned 5 percent. Other


participants in the proposed project besides Delta Oil include the


Crescent Group of Pakistan, Gazprom of Russia, Hyundai Engineering &


Construction Co. of South Korea, Inpex and Itochu of Japan."





"Besides the gas pipeline," the EIA added, "Unocal also had considered


building a 1,000-mile, 1-million barrel-per-day...capacity oil pipeline


that would link Chardzou, Turkmenistan to Pakistan's Arabian Sea Coast


via Afghanistan. Since the Chardzou refinery is already linked to


Russia's Western Siberian oil fields, this line could provide a possible


alternative export route for regional oil production from the Caspian


Sea. The $2.5 billion pipeline is known as the Central Asian Oil


Pipeline Project. For a variety of reasons, including high political


risk and security concerns, however, financing for this project remains


highly uncertain."





In January 1998, Unocal and the Taliban hammered out the gas pipeline


agreement. But by the end of 1998, both of the pipeline deals collapsed


and the Unocal consortium gave up on working with the Taliban regime. It


then became increasingly clear that the Taliban were an obstacle to gas


and oil flowing through Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, Khalilzad took a


more "hard line" position on the Taliban.





If this story of another war over oil and natural gas deposits begins to


sound like a "broken record," it is because the history of capitalism is


filled with these cases. In the pursuit of new markets and raw


materials, the risks of war and terrorist acts are the rule, not the


exception. Nationalistic fervor and an understandable tendency to panic


when the trauma of terrorism hits so close to home often obscure these


basic realities. But workers who are aware of the real causes of this


war will not be hoodwinked.





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