COALITION DEMANDS SOLUTION FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR VULNERABILITY TO TERRORIST ATTACKS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AUGUST 10, 2004

CONTACT PHONE / ORGANIZATION

David Kraft, 011-49-40-430-7332 (direct)
(847)869-7650, neis (at) neis.org, Nuclear Energy Information Service, Evanston, IL

Deb Katz, (413) 339-5781, Citizens Awareness Network

Dr. Gordon Thompson, (617) 491-5177, Institute for Resource & Security Studies

Paul Gunter, (202) 328-0002, Nuclear Information & Resource Service

Today, a coalition of national, regional, and local environmental, public interest, and nuclear watchdog organizations petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to hold emergency enforcement hearings on a significant structural vulnerability to terrorism existing at 32 U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors located in 15 states.

“Nuclear reactors are predeployed weapons of mass destruction,” said Deb Katz, Executive Director of Citizens Awareness Network, a regional group and one of the petition’s authors. “It is the NRC’s job to protect our health and safety and assure public confidence in the regulatory process. Presently NRC’s efforts are inadequate,” concluded Katz.

The petition spotlights the General Electric Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactor (BWR) designs, 24 Mark I and 8 Mark II reactors, where large inventories of highly radioactive waste – used reactor fuel rods – are currently stored in densely packed elevated storage ponds, above and outside the primary containment structure. The roof top nuclear waste storage ponds are vulnerable to a variety of attacks from above, below, and on three sides of the reactor designs.

“The structural vulnerability at these reactors can no longer be quietly tolerated,” said Paul Gunter with Washington, DC-based Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS). “NRC must stop protecting the nuclear industry from the cost of security and assess the true cost of protecting these reactors against terrorism,” said Gunter.

An NRC study issued in October 2000 entitled “Technical Study on Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors,” specifically identifies the structural vulnerabilities of Mark I and II BWRs to aircraft penetration. “Mark I and Mark II secondary containments generally do not appear to have any significant structures that might reduce the likelihood of aircraft penetration,” said the report. The publicly available government report additionally stated that the public health consequences of a nuclear fuel fire caused by the loss of cooling water in the storage pond could result in tens of thousands of deaths out to 500 miles from the damaged facility.

The nuclear security coalition’s emergency petition comes on the heels congressional appropriators urging NRC to take “immediate steps” to upgrade fuel pool safety and security and that the NRC conduct further analyses of pool vulnerabilities, focusing on certain types of terrorist attacks. The committee gave NRC 90 days to report back. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks NRC has ignored structural vulnerabilities and consequences of a successful attack on reactor fuel pools, instead describing them as “well engineered” and “robust” structures despite pre-September 11th findings to the contrary.

“Our more than intuitive and reasonable request comes one week after the NRC stated it would further restrict public access and analysis of safety related issues; and more ominously, one day after Japan’s worse nuclear accident attributable to ‘a cover-up culture in which…far greater loyalty [is shown] to…companies than to the public's right to know.’ (NYT, 8/9/04) Similar NRC abdication of its regulatory responsibility to protect the public must be aggressively rooted out, by an act of Congress if necessary, before Illinois experiences similar ‘worst-case’ accidents of its own,” warned David A. Kraft, director of the Illinois-based nuclear watchdog group Nuclear Energy Information Service.

Illinois 14 reactors (11 of which are operational) are the most of any state in the U.S., all run by Exelon Corporation. Four of these reactors – Dresden 2&3 near Morris, IL, 45 miles SW of Chicago, and Quad Cities 1&2, near Cordova on the Mississippi River -- possess such vulnerable spent fuel pools and reactor containments.

The petition requests that the NRC take immediate action to address these structural vulnerabilities to acts of terrorism in the nation’s defenses. These actions include:

* Empowering an independent review of Mark I and II spent fuel pool vulnerabilities;
* Developing a comprehensive plan for addressing the danger presented by the Mark I and II fuel pools, including alternative storage options for spent fuel as well as improvements in security and emergency response;
* Establishing an open, democratic process which allows local communities and the public to be involved in the evaluation of the risk reduction measures;
* Issuing a “Demand for Information” to Mark I and II operators, requiring them to provide the data necessary to conduct the emergency review.

The request for process that is open, democratic, and inclusive of the public and affected communities is central to the coalition’s petition. Since September 11, 2001, NRC has unilaterally neglected input from the public interest groups, affected communities and other government agencies, and instead allied itself with nuclear reactor owners. NRC’s response to the 9-11 attacks has been characterized by secrecy, superficial improvements and public relations.